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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RAY DODGE, 
v. 
JOHN W. TURNER, 
Warden, Ftah State Prison, 
Petitioner-
Appellant, 
Respondent-
Respondent. 
Case No. 
10880 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Ray Dodge, appeals from the de-
nial of a writ of habeas corpus by the Second Judi-
cial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Hearing was held on appellant's petition for 
writ of habeas corpus on the 23rd day of March, 
1967, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Dis-
trict Judge of the Second Judicial District, Weber 
County, following which the writ was denied and 
2 
the appellant remanded back to the Utah State 
Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the 
Second District Court denying the petition for writ 
of habeas corpus be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, a prisoner in the Utah State 
Prison, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
the District Court of Weber County. As far as re-
spondent can determine, the petition alleges, among 
other things, that appellant is unlawfully restrained 
of his liberty at the Utah State Prison because: (1) he 
was not represented by counsel at the time of his 
initial arraignment in Ogden City Court on the 
charge of burglary in the second degree and of be-
ing an habitual criminal; (2) he was not represented 
by counsel at the time he waived preliminary exam-
ination; (3) he did not effectively waive his right to 
counsel or to a preliminary examination; (4) incom-
petence of counsel at trial; (5) he was improperly 
sentenced for being an habitual criminal; (6) he was 
improperly sentenced for the crime of first degree 
perjury. 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the peti-
tion, and on March 15, 1967, Judge Wahlquist ruled 
the allegations enumerated as 4, 5, and 6, above, 
had previously been raised by appellant on appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court, and that a hearinq 
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would be held on matter relating to allegations 
enumerated above as l, 2, and 3. (R-12) Counsel stip-
ulated that the transcript of proceedings in the 
burglary and habitual criminal actions could be in-
troduced into evidence.11 
On May 12, 1965, appellant was charged in the 
City Court of Ogden City, County of Weber, with 
the crime of burglary in the second degree and on 
a separate complaint with being an habitual crim-
inal. He appeared that date before the Honorable 
Donald 0. Hyde, City Judge, whereupon the com-
plaints were read to appellant and copies delivered 
to him. 
The transcript reflects: 
The Court informed defendant of his legal right to 
a preliminary examination and to the aid of counsel 
at every stage of the proceedings against him, and 
he is asked bv the Court if he desires the aid of coun-
sel to which he answers that he does. 
The matter was continued to May 21, 1965, for fur-
ther proceedings. (T-1) 
On May 21, the appellant appeared again be-
fore Judge Hyde. At that time he requested permis-
sion to waive preliminary examination. The State 
consented to the waiver and the appellant was 
bound over to the Second District Court to answer. 
(T-1) 
1 I The transcript of proceedings in the burglary and habitual criminal 
actions will be referred to as "T". The proceedings in the hearing on 
appellant's petition for habeas corpus will be referred to as "R''. 
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An Information was filed May 27, 1965, by the 
District Attorney charging appellant with burglary 
in the second degree and, on page 2 of the Informa-
tion, with being an habitual criminal. Appellant was 
arraigned on the Information June 1, 1965, before 
the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, at which time 
counsel was appointed to represent him. (T-5) On 
June 7, 1965, the appellant entered his plea of not 
guilty to the charges on page 1 and 2 of the Informa-
tion. (T-6) 
Jury trial was had June 29, 1965, and appellant 
was found guilty of burglary in the second degree 
and was found to be an habitual criminal. (T-11) On 
July 1, 1965, Judge Cowley sentenced Dodge for 
burglary in the second degree and for being an 
habitual criminal to a term in the Utah State Prison 
of "not less than fifteen years and which may be 
for life." (T-21) 
At the hearing on appellant's petition for a wnt 
of habeas corpus, Dodge testified that between May 
12, and May 21, 1965, he contacted an attorney to 
represent him. Apparently appellant did not make 
the necessary financial arrangements with the at-
torney. (R-7) He contacted no other attorney. (R-8) 
Appellant testified that when he appeared on 
May 21, 1965, before Judge Hyde, the following oc-
curred: 
A. He asked me if I was ready to proceed and I told 
him that I never had a lawyer so I wanted to waive 
my preliminary hearing, and he said, "Do you realize 
what you are doing-?' I think that is what he said and 
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I said, 'Yes, I want to waive my preliminary hear-
ing.' 
Richard L. Stine, Esq., testified at the hearing as 
a witness for respondent. He stated he was appoint-
ed by the Court to represent appellant at the trial 
(R-30), that the sentences that could be imposed on 
appellant were discussed {R-31), that Dodge did not 
request Stine to obtain a preliminary examination 
for him (R-31), that in his (Stine's) opinion, a prelim-
inary examination would not have been of assist-
ance in Dodge's defense {R-32), nor would have a 
Bill of Particulars been of any benefit {R-32). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS BY CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS. 
At the time of his appearance in Ogden City 
Court before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, City 
Judge, the transcript indicates that appellant was 
properly advised of his right to legal counsel and 
to a preliminary examination, at which time the ap-
pellant indicated he desired legal counsel, where-
upon the court continued the matter to May 21, 1965. 
On May 21, before the same court, appellant 
requested permission to waive the preliminary ex-
amination, which was consented to by the Assistant 
County Attorney, whereupon the City Judge bound 
over the appellant to District Court. (T-1, 2) 
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On June 7, 1965, the appellant and his counsel 
appeared before Judge Cowley to enter a plea of not 
guilty to the Information. (T-6) Jury trial was held 
June 29, 1965, within a month following appellant's 
voluntary waiver of preliminary examination in Og-
den City Court. Had appellant desired a preliminary 1 
examination, he could have moved the District 
Court to remand the case back to the City Court for 
a preliminary examination. Respondent submits that 
appellant's waiver of preliminary examination, plus 
his failure to move the District Court for a remand 1 
to City Court to conduct a preliminary examination, 
constitutes a knowledgable and voluntary waiver 
by appellant of his right to a preliminary examina-
tion. 
Although appellant was not represented by 
counsel at the time he waived preliminary examina-
tion before the Ogden City Court, his failure to re-
quest a preliminary examination following the ap-
pointment of counsel to represent him tends to 
negate his claim that he was denied due process of 
law. In fact, he stated he did not remember ever re-
questing Mr. Stine secure a preliminary examination 
for him. (R-21, 22) 
In McGuffey v. Turner. ________ Utah ________ 2d _______ , 
423 P.2d 166, 167 (1967), this court, in reversing a 
District Court ruling granting a writ of habeas 
corpus, stated: 
It is the practice in the trial courts of this state to 
remand a criminal case for preliminary hearing when 
the defendant requests it at arraignment when ti:e , 
preliminary hearing has been theretofor waived. It 1' 
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rather difficult to see how a guilty defendant is preju-
diced by waiving a preliminary hearing when all that 
is entailed at the hearing is that sufficient evidence 
be given to the committing magistrate to cause him 
to believe that a crime has been committed and that 
there is probably cause to believe the defendant 
guilty thereof. 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19 (1953). 
This Court held in State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 
71 P.2d 196 (1937), that before a defendant can be 
bound over to District Court he is entitled to a pre-
liminary examination unless, with consent of th~ 
State, he waives such hearing; and if hearing is 
waived, defendant thereby, impliedly at least, 
agrees that the evidence the State would have pro-
duced would have been sufficient to justify the 
magistrate holding him over; and thereby consents 
that he be held for trial, and that no witnesses need 
be produced. 
In State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 
655 (1966), this court was confronted with an almost 
identical situation. The court decided the following 
issue: 
Assuming that the defendant was without counsel 
when he waived preliminary hearing, is that a defect 
of such gravity as to invalidate his conviction? 
Concluding that it was not such a defect, the court 
stated at page 658: 
There had been some previous discussion with the 
court in regard to the defendant having an attorney. 
Whether he was advised to waive the preliminary 
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hearing or not, it is indisputable that he had con-
ferred with his attorney, Mr. Hisatake, about some-
thing; and that he appeared in court and voluntarily 
stated his desire to waive a preliminary hearing. 
After he was bound over, the District Court appointed 
competent counsel who proceeded to represent him 
and who conducted the trial in his behalf. If the de-
fendant or his counsel had in good faith believed that 
a preliminary hearing would have helped him in any 
way, there was ample opportunity to request one. We 
suspect that it was deliberate that no such request 
was made. Rather he attempted to take advantage 
of the claimed defect in proceedure by moving to have 
the charge against him dismissed entirely. This is 
something he was not entitled to. Such a defect as 
he complains of would not in any event have the 
effect of totally exonerating him of the offense 
charged, but would only be subject to correction if 
he so requested and the interest of justice so re-
quired. 
Appellant raised the issue of his lack of counsel 
prior to waiving preliminary examination in his pre-
vious appeal as "allegation 5". This court chose not 
to give cognizance to this issue in that case. See 
State v. Dodge. 18 Utah 2d 63, 415 P.2d 212 (1966). 
It is apparent that appellant was advised of h~:; 
right to counsel and that he contacted an attorney 
to represent him. At the hearing on his petition for 
writ of habeas corpus, appellant stated: 
I tried to make a deal with Mr. Richards to represent 
me, but I couldn't get any money, so when I went 
to court I waived preliminary hearing and went on 
to the District Court. ( R-5) 
Respondent submits further that the appellant 
was aware of his rights to a hearing and counsel 
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and with the proceedings at preliminary examina-
tion by reason of his previous scrapes with the law, 
having been involved with felony charges on three 
previous occasions. (R-14) As such, his waiver of 
preliminary examination without counsel present 
was voluntary. See Workman v. Tumer . ........ Utah 
2d ________ , 425 P.2d 402 (1967). 
This court has previously held that a voluntary 
waiver of preliminary examination precludes a de-
fendant thereafter from asserting, in any subse-
quent proceedings, anything he could have assert-
ed had the examination taken place, and he cannot 
claim a discharge because no examination was held, 
nor later complain of irregularities because they 
were waived when the defendant fails to raise them 
at the proper time. See State v. Freeman. 93 Utah 
125, 71 P.2d 196 (1937), and State v. Gustaldi. 41 Utah 
63, 123 Pac. 897 (1912). Nor are the proceedings viti-
ated even though the accused has not waived his 
right to counsel. State v. Crank. 105 Utah 332, 142 
P.2d 178, 170 A.LR. 542 (1943). 
Nor does the failure of the accused to have 
counsel at preliminary examination constitute preju-
dicial error. Since the preliminary examination is 
an inquiry, not a trial, it is held in the place of the 
common law grand jury where the accused is only 
present if called as a witness. State v. Braasch. et. al .. 
119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 (1951). 
Numerous courts have determined that, under 
laws similar to the Utah statutes, the failure to haVF~ 
counsel at preliminary examination is not prejudi-
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cial to the accused. The United States Supreme 
Court has determined that in certain jurisdictions, 
wherein preliminary examination or initial arraign-
ment are critical stages in a criminal proceeding, 
counsel must be afforded the accused. See Hamil-
ton v. Alabama. 368 U.S. 52 (1961), and White v. 
Maryland. 373 U.S. 59 (1963). However, the White 
and Hamilton cases have no application here be-
cause they deal with facts totally different from the 
instant case and proceedure unique to those juris-
dictions. 
Waiver of preliminary examination or absence 
of counsel at that stage is not prejudicial to an ac-
cused. In point is the case of Freeman v. State. 392 
P.2d 542 (Idaho 1964), wherein the court stated: 
While it is recognized that an accused has a right to 
counsel at every stage in the proceedings, we do not 
understand this to mean that he must be so repre-
sented in the preliminary processes which take place 
primarily for the purpose of ascertaining whether a 
crime has been committed and whether there are 
reasonable grounds to hold that the accused has com-
mitted it, and particularly, where no prejudice has 
befallen him. 
See also State v. Cox. 183 Kansas 571, 396 P.2d 326 
(1964), citing Latham v. Crouse, 320 Federal 2d 120 
(10 Cir. 1963), wherein the court stated: 
The first contention is that petitioner's were en· 
titled to have counsel appointed for them prior to the 
preliminary examination. Heavy reliance is placed 
on the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in Gideon v. Wainright Corrections Director, 372 
U.S. 385 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed 2d 799. That case con-
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cerned the right of an accused to counsel at trial-
not at a preliminary hearing. In State of Utah v. 
Sullivan, 10 Cir., 227 F.2d 511, 513, certiorari de-
nied sub nom., and Braasch v. State, 350 U.S. 973, 
76 S.Ct. 499, 100 L.Ed. 844, we held that in circum-
stances where an accused did not enter a plea of 
guilty at a preliminary hearing, the failure to furnish 
counsel at such hearing did not abridge the accused's 
fundamental constitutional right. That decision is 
controlling here. No claim is made of any incriminat-
ing statements or acts of the petitioners at the pre-
liminary examination. All they did was to waive the 
right to a preliminary hearing. Prejudice is asserted 
on the ground that counsel would have forced the 
prosecution to disclose at least some of its evidence. 
The point is not well taken as more than a month 
in advance of trial copies of the confessions and lists 
of the prosecution's witnesses were given defense 
counsel. Our conclusions in State of Utah v. Sullivan 
are supported by the decisions of other circuits. We 
find nothing in Gideon v. Wainright which requires 
a review of the decision in State of Utah v. Sullivan. 
Respondent submits that appellant was in no 
way prejudiced by not having counsel at the time 
he waived preliminary examination. Had he wanted 
counsel, he could have requested it. Had he desired 
a preliminary examination, he could have obtained 
one. His failure to request counsel be appointed for 
him prior to waiving his preliminary examination, 
having full knowledge of the purpose of a prelim-
inary examination and the rights afforded to him by 
reason of his past experiences, indicates a voluntary 
waiver and one of which the appellant cannot now 
claim a defect of such gravity as would entitle him 
to be discharged from the Utah State Prison and the 
judgment of conviction reversed. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-2 (1953), provides: 
No defect or irregularity in or want or absence of 
any proceeding or statutory requirement, prior to 
the filing of an information or indictment, including 
the preliminary hearing, shall constitute prejudicial 
error and the defendant shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to have waived any such defect, irregularity, 
want or absence of proceeding of statutory require-
ment, unless he shall before pleading to the informa-
tion or indictment specifically and expressly object 
to the information or indictment on such groun<l . 
. . . (Emphasis added). 
Appellant had the opportunity to obtain a pre-
liminary examination had he so wanted one by re-
questing the District Court to remand the case to 
the City Court. This he and his counsel admit was 
not done. As such, they have effectively waived the 
right to preliminary examination. 
Appellant had the opportunity to request a bill 
of particulars. At least one week elapsed from his 
arraignment in District Court at which time counsel 
was appointed for him and the time scheduled for 
entry of his plea. Prior to the entry of his plea, re-
spondent could have moved to quash the Informa-
tion and could have demanded a Bill of Particulars. 
His counsel was of the opinion that it would be of 
no benefit to appellant's defense. (R-32) Having 
failed to so demand a Bill of Particulars, appellant 
waived the right. Appellant is estopped to urge on 
appeal error in the trial court for the failure of the 
court to provide a bill of particulars. See State v. 
Bleazard. 103 Utah 113 133 P.2d 1000 (1943). 
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With respect to appellant's claim that he was im-
properly sentenced as an habitual criminal, this 
matter has previously been resolved by this court. 
Respondent submits that appellant incorrectly cites 
the record on this point in support of his allegation. 
(T-20) 
It is well settled that the petitioner in a habeas 
corpus proceeding has the burden of proving the 
grounds upon which he relies for his release by 
evidence that is clear and convincing. See Mc-
Guffey v. Turner. op.cit., citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.LR. 
357 (1938); Wilson v. Hand. 181 Kan. 483, 311 P.2d 
009 (1957); and Application of Gaskill. (Okl. Cr.) 335 
P.2d 1088 (1959). See also Workman v. Turner. 
________ Utah 2d ________ , 425 P.2d 402 (1967). 
Respondent submits that appellant has failed to 
prove any grounds upon which relief can be grant-
ed, and further, the evidence adduced by him at 
the hearing was less than clear and convincing. 
An examination of the record discloses that the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1953), 
were complied with by Judge Hyde. (T-16) A reason-
able time was allowed appellant to obtain counsel 
and, respondent submits, a postponement of the pre-
liminary examination would have been granted ap-
pellant had he so requested for the purpose of ob-
taining counsel or having the court appoint counsel 
for him. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant's contentions on appeal are totally 
without merit. No cases exist for reversal or for dis-
charge of appellant from incarceration. Therefore, 
respondent submits that the judgment of the District 
Court denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WARREN M. WEGGELAND 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
